Alexander Corbeil is a lead analyst with The SecDev Group and a fellow with The SecDev Foundation focusing on the Syrian conflict and its impact on the Middle East and North Africa. Alexander also writes on Lebanese politics and Hezbollah for Carnegie Endowment's Sada. Bylines at Foreign Affairs, The Globe and Mail and others. You can follow him on Twitter @alex_corbeil.
Today CNN reported that the review process surrounding the decision to release 28 classified pages from a joint congressional report that focused on alleged Saudi Arabian involvement in 9/11 is in its final stages. Quoting Senator Bob Graham, the co-chair of the 2002 inquiry who has led the campaign to have them released, CNN stated that the review will be handed off to an inter-agency group, including intelligence, law enforcement and defense agencies. A final decision, according to Graham, will come sometime in June.
Yesterday, the New York Times posted a document released by the U.S. National Archives that points to what may be included in the still classified 28 pages. Dated June 6, 2003, the document includes a number of memos composed by 9/11 commission members detailing possible connections between the hijackers and Saudi government members. 47, mostly repetitive pages, includes a segment entitled, “A Brief Overview of Possible Saudi Government Connections to the September 11th attacks”. Two sub-headings detail proven and probably links between Saudi representatives and the hijackers. The first, “Southern Californian Connections”, include those with links to Saudi Arabia who have proven or strongly suggested links to two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. The second, “Other Possible Saudi Government Contacts”, includes a number of individuals with ties to Saudi Arabia who may have interacted with al-Hazmi or al-Mihdhar, either directly or through others.
Below I have created a crumbnet, using Thetus‘ Savanna technology, of the possible Saudi-9/11 links using the information provided under the Southern Californian Connections heading in the U.S. National Archives release. The crumbnet provides a brief overview and visual representation of the the links between Saudi-affiliated individuals and two of the 9/11 hijackers.
On February 24, the Saudi Arabian-owned Al Arabiya news network posted a video of what it claimed was a meeting last summer between Hezbollah commander Abu Saleh and Houthi forces in Yemen. The video shows a man in military fatigues addressing a group in Lebanese-accented Arabic about training for assassination operations inside Saudi Arabia, including a specific attack against an unnamed Saudi commander of border forces.
The current war in Yemen began with the country’s unsuccessful political transition following the ouster of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Disenchantment with the post-Saleh political arrangement turned to civil war, pitting Houthis, a Zaidi Shia religious movement, and the former president against the country’s central authorities. Saudi Arabia, which intervened in support of the central government, claims that it is also a proxy war, one in which Houthi forces have been supplied and trained by Iran and its most successful proxy militia, Hezbollah. Officially Lebanon’s Hezbollah denies these accusations, but as Amarnath Amarasingam and I learned during a recent trip to Beirut, the group is playing a very active role. Read more here in Foreign Affairs.
Hezbollah’s entrance into the Syrian conflict to help support the floundering regime of Bashar al-Assad has cost it dearly. An estimated 1,300 of its fighters have been killed, a large portion for an organization that has fielded only 6,000 to 8,000 combatants in Syria. Social services, key to Hezbollah’s populist program in Lebanon and crucial to many within its Shia constituency, have been reduced to pay for the conflict. The military strain has even forced the group to recruit teenagers for domestic security roles and offensive operations in Syria.
While the group has had to adjust to many pressures from the Syrian conflict it has also benefited, both due to the combat experience and the entrance of a new and powerful ally. Moscow’s decision to intervene in Syria this past September on behalf of the Assad regime has brought with it a number of tactical and strategic benefits that have and will continue to bolster Hezbollah in Syria, at home and in any future confrontation with Israel. For more read my piece in Carnegie Endowment’s Sada journal.
The successful implementation of a cessation of hostilities in Syria looks doubtful. The Assad regime with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah has mounted an increasingly deadly campaign to crush rebels in the north of the country. It comes at a time when all sides should be enacting confidence building measures. Meant to cut off the opposition from the Turkish border and surround the country’s largest city, Aleppo, the regime’s assault is taking a heavy toll on the civilian population. Making matters worse, on Monday Bashar al-Assad and his Russian allies targeted hospitals and schools using aircraft and by some reports, cruise missiles. It resulted in at least 46 dead and dozens injured.
Turkey, France and the UN say these attacks violate international law, while Russia has categorically denied it carried out the attacks on three hospitals and one school. In a bizarre and nonsensical statement by the Russian Defence Ministry, Moscow even attacked Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) for not providing information about the locations of the hospitals in Maarat al-Numan and Azaz which were targeted by the bombardment. The Syrian ambassador blamed the US for the strikes, a laughable assessment.
The pattern is clear. According to Physicians for Human Rights, as early as 2011 government forces attacked hospitals in Damascus, Homs and Hama, impeded medical transport and detained and tortured doctors who treated wounded civilians. The organization has mapped these war crimes and documented a total of 336 attacks on health care facilities, 285 of which were carried out by the Syrian regime, another 12 by Russian forces. Furthermore, Amnesty International has documented the murder of 569 health care professionals between April 2011 and October 2014, a number that is likely to be much larger.
As shown by these figures, these deliberate attacks on healthcare facilities are not new. The fact that Russia is participating in what has, since the beginning of the conflict, been a policy of attacking medical facilities and those who work in them, should not come as a surprise. David Nott, a physician who has worked in Syria told BBC World Service that, “If you take out a healthcare worker, you take out healthcare for about 10,000-20,000 people and they won’t feel secure in the area and will feel that they need to leave.” Dr. Nott is right, the targeting of healthcare services by the Syrian regime is meant to ensure that civilians in rebel held areas fear living there and leave. Though, it is also part of a systemic effort by the regime, which has been on display since the beginning of the conflict, to ensure that rebels do not build up governance capacities within the territory they hold. This includes targeting bread lines and water infrastructure with barrel bombs, airstrikes and artillery.
The following are the final messages of the nine lions of the Khalifah who were mobilized from their dens to bring an entire country – France – to her knees. This is how the latest release from Al-Hayat Media Center, the Islamic State’s foreign language propaganda arm, introduces viewers to the assailants that carried out last November’s terrorist attack in Paris. On Friday, 13 November, nine attackers targeted six separate locations across Paris, killing 130 and injuring another 368, roughly a third of them critically. As mentioned in a previous post, the events of 13 November made the attack the deadliest in France since World War II and may have been the deadliest attack in a Western city since 9/11. The attack began at 21:20 with a suicide bombing at the Stade de France, where French President Francois Hollande was in attendance to watch a soccer game against Germany. As two other suicide bombers targeted the stadium, another team of assailants shot up a bar and restaurant in the 10th district, near the Place de la Republique at 21:25 before moving on to target a cafe and pizzeria on rue de la Fontaine au Roi at 21:31. Another gun attack attack occurred on Rue de Charoone at 21:36, four minutes before a suicide bomber targeted Boulevard Voltaire. The deadliest attack began at 00:20 in the sold out 1,500 seat venue, Bataclan concert hall. Three attackers, wearing suicide belts, entered the concert hall, shooting indiscriminately with Kalashnikov assault rifles. When police stormed the building all three of the assailants managed to detonate their explosives. The machine gun fire and bombs resulted in the death of 98 people and the critical injury of another 99.
The French banner for Kill Them Wherever You Find Them
Kill Them Wherever You Find Them portrays the nine attackers (Abul Qa’qa’ al-Baljiki, Dhul-Qarnayan al-Baljiki, Abu Fu’ad al-Farsani, Abu Rayyan al-Faransi, Abu ‘Umar al-Baljiki, Abu Qital al-Faransi, Ali al-Iraqi, ‘Ukasharh al-Iraqi, and Abu Mujaed al-Baljik) as heroes, defending their coreligionists in the face of external intervention by the West in what seems to be viewed by the assailants as both a religious war in the Muslim world and a cosmic battle against the Christian West. To drive this message home, the Islamic State-based members of the Paris cell are shown executing murtad, apostates, after their statements have been completed, a mark of cruelty that has come to define Islamic State media outputs. Interestingly, it is the foreign fighters that are tasked with beheading their hostages, while the Iraqi members merely shoot their victims to death. The attackers also embrace the term terrorist, using it proudly and calling upon their coreligionists in the West to carry out attacks, using any means available, a call that the Islamic State has echoed repeatedly, whether through its official spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani or individual Western members.
Abu Rayyan al-Faransi (Omar Ismail Mostefai), the last of the attackers to speak on film, highlights the importance of researchers understanding the legacy of jihadist thought. Aby Rayyan echoes Abdullah Azzam, the ideologue who spread the belief that jihad was fard ‘ayn (individually obligatory) when he calls on countrymen to emigrate to the Islamic State. While all of these facets of Kill Them Wherever You Find Them are important for further understanding the Islamic State, its ideology, goals and threat to the West, it is the release of the video itself that is the most important.
Mostefai claiming jihad is an individual duty
Kill Them Wherever You Find Them proves that the Paris attack was centrally directed by the higher echelons of the Islamic State, if not the group’s supposed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The fact that the video was released by Al-Hayat (the same outlet that releases the official Dabiq magazine and has produced a number of other high quality videos threatening the West) shows that the group played a much larger role than some previously had thought, and that the events in Paris were not merely inspired, with the Islamic State claiming responsibility after the fact, as it has done before. In fact, the first of the nine assailants to appear on film, Abu Qital al-Faransi, states, “I was sent by [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] to cleanse the earth of disbelievers. Once the beheading is finished, he states, “soon on the Champs de Elysee”.
What is more chilling is this latest release ends with a clip from British PM David Cameron’s address to the French people, standing in solidarity with them after the Paris attacks. A caption then comes across the screen: Whoever Stands in the Ranks of Kufr Will Be A Target for Our Swords And Will Fall In Humiliation. It is likely that the next plot orchestrated within the so-called Caliphate will be attempted in the United Kingdom.
On 3 February, Syrian regime troops and their allies reached the encircled towns of Nubl and Zahraa to the north-west of Aleppo city. Predominantly Shia, the two towns had been surrounded by rebel forces for much of the last three-and-a-half years. Under Russian air cover, Hezbollah, Shia militas and Syrian government forces pushed out from the village of Hardatnin, through Musrassat Khan and into the two regime bastions. In doing so they effectively cut off rebel held areas in eastern Aleppo city from the Turkish border crossing of Bab al-Salama, a crucial supply route for food, oil and weapons.
A map of the regime’s progress in Aleppo (@PetoLucem)
This victory was one of three major regime achievements over the past few weeks, all of which relied heavily on foreign fighters in leading roles and the use of Russian air support. 26 January saw Syrian troops, allied militias and Hezbollah capture Sheikh Miskeen, in Dara governorate. The town, held by rebels since 2014, had connected the Jordanian border to rebel bastions in the capital, Damascus. While it has been reported that intra-rebel tensions contributed to its fall, the concentration of Russian air power on Sheikh Miskeen and the use of Lebanon’s Hezbollah on the ground were instrumental in its capture.
The regime victory in Sheikh Miskeen came close after the 12 January capture of Salma, in Latakia governorate. The town had been the last major rebel bastion in what is a regime stronghold on the coast of the Mediterranean. During the regime operation a video emerged of Russian commanders overseeing the battle and a few days later, footage from a Russian-led press tour of Salma highlighted the significant role Russian special forces played in its capture. Salma and neighbouring rebel held areas had been under the control of the opposition for the past three years and provided them with a strategic overview of the surrounding area. It was believed that rebels had planned to use Salma to push further into Alawite dominated Latakia governorate, to target the Syrian President’s coreligionists and pressure the regime.
Regime capture of Salma, Latakia Governorate (@PetoLucem)
It is telling that the first flag to be raised above Nubl and Zahraa after the siege had been broken was that of Lebanon’s Hezbollah. These regime victories were achieved years after rebels had initially captured strategic areas in the country’s north, east and south and only with the help of outside actors. At minimum, there is enough video, picture and reporting evidence to assume that the Syrian regime was incapable of achieving these military gains on their own. Even if rumors of Russian special forces involvement are discounted due to a lack of evidence in the cases of Sheikh Miskeen and Nubl and Zahraa, it is clear that Hezbollah played a major role in the capture of the two former villages. Furthermore, according to pro-regime sources, it seems that Russian special forces at minimum are in the process of expanding their presence on the ground in Aleppo governorate.
Nubl and Zahraa militia pose with Hezbollah fighters
This reliance on outside actors begs the question, will the Syrian regime be able to consolidate these victories and reestablish governance over areas once held by the opposition? Up until the Russian intervention on 30 September, sparked by the falling fortunes of the regime, it seemed as if a rebel victory in Syria was inevitable. A second governorate capital had been lost in Idlib. The city of Palmyra, the middle point between the Islamic State-held western portions of Syria and Damascus had also fallen under control of the diabolical group. The Syrian army and its allies had also not managed to make any significant gains in the year before. The toll of the five year battle for Syria’s future was beginning to have a large impact, the Syrian army had lost roughly 50,000 men, allied militias 36,000 and Hezbollah, 900 fighters, more than the 60,000 domestic and foreign rebel fighters that had been killed in the course of the conflict.
The regime’s ability to take advantage of its recent victories isn’t only a matter of manpower, it is also one of legitimacy. Since March 2011 when the government of Bashar al-Assad decided to shoot its way out of the revolution, it has employed starvation, barrel bombs, and chemical weapons in order to make up for its lack of manpower, in turn causing untold suffering on the majority Sunni Muslim population. Unlike domestic Syrian troops and their rebel counterparts, at some point those foreign Shia militias from Iraq, Hezbollah from Lebanon and of course, the Russian military and air force will have to return home, leaving behind a regime that has increasingly relied on minority groups to defend its hold over much of the Syrian population. Once this occurs the regime may again face calls for change to the country’s governance system and possibly, if it can not come to an equitable arrangement with opposition supporters, experience yet another civil war. With the faltering of the Geneva III peace process it seems that the regime and Russia are not yet willing to acknowledge the demographic, political and military realities of conflict, and Syria’s future.
On Friday 15 January, four attackers stormed the Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. Following an overnight battle with Burkinabe troops and French special forces, the attackers were killed, two of which were reportedly women. The assault on the Splendid Hotel, frequented by foreigners, is first of its kind for the landlocked former French colony of 17 million and may mark a significant change in the security situation in West Africa.
In two statements online al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Mourabitoun, a spin off of AQIM that has since rejoined its parent organization, claimed responsibility for the attack that killed over 20 and injured 150. The former even released an audio file purportedly of a phone call between its media arm, Al-Andalus, and a Hassanniya-speaking attacker during the assault on the Splendid Hotel. In the claim of responsibility, AQIM characterized their terrorist operation as “revenge against France and the disbelieving West”, stating that while the operation was jointly carried out by the groups, it was members of al-Mourabitoun who had stormed the hotel.
This is not the first time that AQIM and al-Mourabitoun have carried out a joint attack targeting European civilians in West Africa. In November, the groups jointly stormed the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, the capital of Mali, killing at least 22, before the two attackers were put down by security forces. These attacks and other smaller ones come at a time of instability in western and northern Africa that has allowed jihadist groups in the region to take advantage of the chaos.
After an insurgency led by Tuareg rebels and their Arab allies threatened to overthrow the government of Mali, French troops entered the country in January 2013. Operation Serval, the result of an official request by the Malian interim government, was viewed as a success, having thwarted jihadists and co-opted rebel groups in the country. By the end of July, French and Malian forces seized all major cities, making the operation a model for the deployment of an expeditionary armed force. In the followup to Operation Serval, the French launched Operation Barkhane, deploying 3,000 troops across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritanian and Niger. Unlike Operation Serval, which was meant to secure territory from groups opposed to the Malian government, the ongoing Operation Barkhane is a wide ranging counter-terrorism mission dealing with an asymmetrical foe that takes advantage of the porous borders of the countries mentioned above and local knowledge of the region.
According to Andrew Lebovich, a vising fellow at the European Council of Foreign Relations and expert on terrorism in West Africa, with French forces spread out for Operation Barkhane and the Malian government struggling to assert its control, AQIM and al-Mourabitoun, among others, have been able to return to a higher tempo of operations and attacks against Western and government interests in the country. Regaining control of areas in central Mali has allowed the jihadist groups to plot and carry out major attacks within the country, and now, in Burkina Faso. The attack in Ouagadougou on the Splendid Hotel is meant to target a regional ally of France involved in Operation Barkhane, spread French troops even thinner and force them to focus their efforts outside of Mali, providing AQIM and al-Mourabitoun with the ability to continue its growth in that country. It is also likely meant to have an impact on the ongoing United Nations peace process, an attempt to find a political solution between Mali’s central government, and the Coordination and Platform rebel alliances. AQIM and its allies rightly fear that any progress by the UN and the parties of the conflict toward a peaceful political solution would diminish their ability to have a robust presence in the country. After an insurgency led by Tuareg rebels and their Arab allies threatened to overthrow the government of Mali, French troops entered the country in January 2013. Operation Serval, the result of an official request by the Malian interim government, was viewed as a success, having thwarted jihadists and co-opted rebel groups in the country. By the end of July, French and Malian forces seized all major cities, making the operation a model for the deployment of an expeditionary armed force. In the followup to Operation Serval, the French launched Operation Barkhane, deploying 3,000 troops across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritanian and Niger. Unlike Operation Serval, which was meant to secure territory from groups opposed to the Malian government, the ongoing Operation Barkhane is a wide ranging counter-terrorism mission dealing with an asymmetrical foe that takes advantage of the porous borders of the countries mentioned above and local knowledge of the region.
This effort to undermine Burkinabe security, spread French forces and undercut the UN peace process is eased by the political and security situation in Burkina Faso. The country’s new president, Roch Marc Christian Kabore, took power last month after the first free election in decades, a year of violent protests and an attempted coup. With the government’s inability to provide security across the country, including along the northern border with Mali, AQIM and al-Mourabitoun will likely attempt another attack against soft civilian targets in Burkina Faso. Having carried out the attack on the Blue Nile Hotel in Bamako and now what seems from initial reports to be a more complex attack on the Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, the next joint AQIM/al-Mourabitoun operation may prove to be even deadlier.
For more, see my interview yesterday with CTV News.